

REMARKS

Applicants have carefully reviewed the Office Action dated April 5, 2007. Reconsideration and favorable action is respectfully requested.

Claims 1-11, 14-17, 19-24 and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Fortenberry* (U.S. Patent No. 6,005,939) in view of *Hartman* (U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411). This rejection is respectfully traversed in view of the currently presented claims.

In the prior Office Action, Claims 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17-19, 22 and 23 had been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being fully anticipated by *Hartman*. The *Fortenberry* reference had not been previously cited by the Examiner. Thus, the amendments to the claims by Applicants have resulted in the Examiner utilizing the *Fortenberry* reference in combination with *Hartman* to support a rejection of the above noted claims. Thus, discussion of the *Fortenberry* reference is warranted in some detail as to its applicability to the current claims.

The *Fortenberry* reference is directed toward the concept of facilitating access to an internet website. In the Background of the Invention section, *Fortenberry* described the technique for conducting business over a public computer network. The example that was utilized was a user making a purchase or conducting a transaction over the internet which required the user to make a purchase/transaction request followed by input of information such as user name, address, social security number, credit card number, etc. (Column 1, lines 13-22.) One problem that was noted by *Fortenberry* is with respect to the user having to re-enter the same information for multiple requests, as this could possibly lead to mistakes in entering the information. *Fortenberry* described the goal of the patent as follows:

It would therefore be desirable to provide a technique for allowing a user to specify particular information once and have the information be used each time the user accesses any site on the public network. (Col. 1, lines 44-47)

As such, it can be seen that the primary goal of *Fortenberry* is to facilitate a user to pre-store information such as profile information, and have that information available such that each time the user accesses a site on the public network, this information can be reused without the requirement to re-enter the information during the purchase/transaction.

The Examiner initially started out on page 3 with a description of how the combination of *Fortenberry* and *Hartman* teach a method of processing profile information of a user for conducting an online transaction between the user and the vendor. The Examiner specifically cited column numbers and line numbers, but did not discuss whether these were column numbers and line numbers from *Fortenberry* or *Hartman*. Applicants believe that these citations are from *Fortenberry* and this response and the arguments herein assume such.

The Examiner first discussed that the claim language:

entering profile information of a user into a profile form at
a user location disposed on a network prior to conduction of an on-
line transaction between the user and the vendor. . .

With respect to this portion of the claim language, the Examiner referred to the disclosure of *Fortenberry* (an assumption for the purpose of this response) beginning at column 7, line 39 and extending to line 45. This portion of the specification is set forth as follows:

First, the user sends a request to generate a passport to passport agent 216, as illustrated by process step 400. The passport agent receives the request, as illustrated by process step 402, and opens a secure communication channel between the passport agent and the requesting user, as illustrated by process 404. (Col. 7, lines 39-45)

This portion of the *Fortenberry* specification is directed toward the user sending a request to a central location in order to create what is termed a “passport.” The Examiner then addresses the next element of the claim, that element being as follows:

issuing to the user a unique code representing stored profile information of the user in response to the user transmitting the profile form from the user location to a second location on the network for storage thereat. . .

The Examiner finds support for this element at column 7, lines 45-65. That portion of the specification in *Fortenberry* is as follows:

Passport agent 216 then presents to the user a series of queries which may be in the form of menus, as illustrated by process block 406. In response, the user enters the requested information such as social security number, drivers license number, etc., and a corresponding level of security to protect the information item, as illustrated by process blocks 408 and 410. The user specified information is referred to herein as user information or environmental variables. The security levels assigned to each item of user information or environment variables range from highly secure to public. For example, particularly sensitive information may be designated as highly secured and assigned a high security level of 100 on an exemplary scale of 0-100 levels. Less sensitive information may be designated as less secured or even public and assigned a lower security level approaching or equal to zero. Next, passport agent 216 provides a public key to the user to access the passport data, as illustrated by process 418. Finally, the user's information which collectively comprises the Internet passport is stored and maintained in a highly secured server site on the Internet which serves as the passport agent and guarantees the integrity of the users passport, as illustrated by process block 420. (Col. 7, lines 45-65)

In this portion of the *Fortenberry* specification, the series of queries that are provided to the user allow the user to input the various information. In addition, the specification sets forth that “next, passport agent 216 provides a public key to the user to access the passport data. . . .” (Column 7, lines 60-61.) However, there is nothing in *Fortenberry* that states that any profile form is filled out and transmitted from the user location to a second location on the network. The claim clearly states that the unique code is issued to the user and this code “represents” the stored profile information of the user and this issuing step is done in response to the user

transmitting the profile form from the user location to the second location. All that *Fortenberry* discloses is the generation of a security key in the form of a public key to the user that the user may utilize later when allowing a vendor to access profile information. Thus, although the public key is unique, the *Fortenberry* reference certainly does not disclose that a profile form is filled out at a user location and then transmitted to a second location. Clearly, there are a plurality of queries that are answered such that the form is actually filled out back at a server location, that location being the location that generates the public key.

The next portion of the claim that the Examiner discussed and which is relevant to this discussion is as follows:

after selecting the product, providing to the vendor location
by the user the unique code for purchase of the product, during the
on-line transaction. . .

The Examiner relies upon the portion of *Fortenberry* set forth at column 8, lines 31-33 which states that “next, the user provides a public key to the vendor, as illustrated in process block 504. The public key was previously provided to the user by passport agent 216.” The Examiner then discusses the section of the claim set forth as follows:

providing the stored profile information from the second
location to the vendor location in response to the vendor location
receiving and processing the unique code. . .

The Examiner merely states that this is all disclosed in column 8. However, the best description of the process flow in *Fortenberry* is that disclosed with respect to Fig. 2b. That portion of the specification associated therewith is described beginning at column 6, line 15 and extending to line 46. That portion of the specification is set forth as follows:

Referring now to FIG. 2B, in general overview, the passport system operates in the following manner. User 208 who wishes to conduct a transaction at web site 210 requests that passport agent 216 release specific user information to web site 210. The request is made as an encrypted message to passport agent 216. Passport

agent 216 has previously been provided a key with which to decrypt the encrypted message from user 208. Passport agent 216 decrypts the request from user 208 to determine, inter alia, the particular web site to which a passport of the user 208 should be sent.

Passport agent 216 then provides encrypted data to the particular web site here denoted as web site 210. User 208 has previously provided to web site 210 a public key with which web site 210 can decode the encrypted data provided by passport agent 216.

The web site 210 receives the encrypted user information (i.e. the passport) from passport agent 216 and unlocks the message using the public key provided by the user 208. If the web site 210 is unable to unlock any of the environment variables in the passport, the request is ignored, as explained hereinafter.

It should be noted that user 208 can provide to web site 210 one of several public keys which allow web site 210 to unlock data having one of several security levels. For example, user 208 may have a first key which unlocks confidential user information in the user passport, a second key which unlocks secret user information in the user passport and a third key which unlocks top secret user information in the user passport. Thus, to unlock all the data in the passport, user 208 would have to provide to web site 210 all three keys. (Col. 6, lines 15-46)

To review the process of *Fortenberry*, in this embodiment, when a user desires to conduct commerce with a particular website, the website (210), the user sends a request to the passport agent (216) to release specific user information thereto. This request is made as an encrypted message which requires the public key. The passport agent then provides the encrypted key to the designated website (210) and, since the user had previously provided to the website (210) a public key, the website (210) can decode the encrypted data provided by passport agent. Therefore, the user must do two things; first, the user must send the public key to the designated website and then the user must request the passport agent to release the profile information of the user to the website. Since the website will then have the public key, it can read the data provided thereto by the passport agent.

With respect to this particular embodiment, there are some differences between the claim language and the operation as disclosed by *Fortenberry*. First, the profile information is not entered into a profile form at a user location disposed on the network and, thereafter, forwarded to the second location which, in response thereto, results in the transmission to the user of a unique code. The profile information is entered directly into the website of the passport agent and, after entry of the information, a unique code in the form of a public key is then forwarded to the user. There are no steps specifically set forth in *Fortenberry* that an on-line transaction is initiated by “selecting” a product of a vendor at a user location; rather, what is done is that a user requests a transaction with a particular vendor (column 8, lines 29-30), with no disclosure of the selection of any product. The description of Fig. 5, beginning at column 8, line 24, discloses that, after a transaction is requested, the next step is to provide a public key to the vendor. The user then requests the passport agent to send the user’s passport to the vendor and there is no step of selecting the product. Further, the claim requires that the stored profile information be provided from the second location to the vendor location “in response to” the vendor location receiving and processing the code. There is no requirement to process the code by the vendor in order for the vendor location to receive the stored profile information. Rather, the user must go outside and actually take some action to cause the location at which the stored profile information is stored to send this information to the vendor. The public key is only utilized to read the information once it is received. Therefore, the portion of the claim that states “in response to” with respect to the step of providing cannot be met by *Fortenberry*. In fact, *Fortenberry* takes a completely different approach in that they specifically require the user to go out and make a specific request to the passport agent to send the information to the particular website of the vendor.

The Examiner indicated that *Fortenberry* taught the operation of passing information from a third party to a vendor to process a transaction after receiving a unique identifier authorizing the release of sensitive information to the vendor. However, the claim requires more. The claim requires that the profile information be entered into a form at the user location and then, in response to transmitting the form to the second location, issuing to the user a unique code and this unique code represents the stored profile information of the user. *Fortenberry* does

not disclose issuing this code after transmitting the form from the user location to the second location. There is no step of initiating an online transaction by selecting a product of the vendor at the user location; rather, all that is disclosed is to initiate a request for a transaction. There is no discussion as to how the transaction occurs after this. Clearly, there is no step of “after selecting the product, providing to the vendor location by the user the unique code for purchase of the product” as set forth in the claim that occurs during the on-line transaction. Further, this on-line transaction does not require the user to view a vendor payment form as set forth in the claim. Since *Fortenberry* clearly requires that the public key is provided to the vendor after a request for transaction and not after selecting the product to be purchased. *Fortenberry* is concerned with identifying the user prior to going forward with the transaction as compared to Applicants claim which utilizes the information, i.e., the stored profile information, for completing the transaction. Further, the claim requires that the stored profile information be provided to the vendor “in response to the vendor location receiving and processing the unique code.” There is no suggestion or teaching in *Fortenberry* that would lead one skilled in the art to change the operation wherein the user in *Fortenberry* sends a public key to the vendor and then sends a request to the passport agent to send the passport to the vendor to allow a previously requested transaction to go forward. The claim clearly requires that the stored profile information is a function of the vendor location receiving and processing the unique code. The vendor location will not even utilize the unique code until it receives the profile information. Therefore, the profile information has to be received before the unique code is even used. This portion of the claim is clearly not met by *Fortenberry*.

The Examiner has stated that the deficiency in *Fortenberry* was that it did not specifically mention inserting released information into a form automatically before submittal to a user. The Examiner relies upon the *Hartman* reference to support this portion of the rejection. This portion was described in the previous response beginning at the bottom of page 14 and extending to the top of page 15. This portion is set forth as follows:

In the last step, at least a portion of the stored profile information is inserted into the vendor payment form in respective fields. The

only place that there is any remote suggestion of such an action is with respect to the original form that was sent to the user, as set forth in Figure 1A. In this section, section (103), there is provided a button for the transaction and, in addition thereto, other information such as address information, links to express ordering, etc. Of the information, the only information that is noted is the name of the user in position (103b). However, the requirement of this step is that, when the user receives the form (noting that this is not a payment form but, rather, an information page) for viewing after insertion, there is a requirement that this insertion follow the steps of selecting a product and then forwarding a unique code to the server for the purpose of initiating the on-line transaction, i.e., purchasing the product, and then a form sent back to the user already filled in. The information is inserted into the web page with the description of the product in *Hartman* prior to the user deciding to select that particular product. In Applicant's present method, the present inventive concept, as defined by the amended claims, requires the selection to have already been made, and the providing of the unique code is performed during the on-line transaction.

In view of the above arguments, Applicants believe that the Examiner's rejection of Claims 1-11, 14-17, 19-24 and 27 in view of the combination of *Fortenberry* and *Hartman* does not disclose, nor suggest all of the elements of the claims and the steps therein. As such, Applicants respectfully request withdrawal of the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) with respect to Claims 1-11, 14-17, 19-24 and 27 in view of these two references.

Claims 12 and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Fortenberry* in view of *Hartman* and further in view of *Rhoads*. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Claims 12 and 25 depend from claims 1 and 14, as described herein above. The addition of *Rhoads* does not cure the deficiencies noted herein above with respect to the combination of *Fortenberry* and *Hartman*. Therefore, Applicants respectfully request withdrawal of the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of Claims 12 and 25.

Claims 13, 18, 26, 28 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Fortenberry* in view of *Hartman* and further in view of *Rhoads*. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Claims 13, 18, 26, 28 and 29 depend from Claims 1 or 14 and the addition of *Rhoads* does not cure the deficiencies noted herein above with respect to the rejection thereof. Therefore, Applicants respectfully request withdrawal of the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of Claims 13, 18, 26, 28 and 29.

The Examiner has indicated that the arguments over *Hartman* were moot in view of the new grounds of rejection. However, Applicant notes that the Examiner has not commented on the detailed analysis of *Hartman* in Applicants' previous Response with respect to the various elements of the claims. The Examiner's statement that "it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to include in *Fortenberry* the confirmation page of *Hartman*, because this was a notoriously well known means for presenting a final order summary that assures the user that the vendor has the order correct" ignores all of the limitations and the order of steps which were set forth in the prior Response filed by Applicants. Clearly, the discussion of *Hartman* set forth that one of the deficiencies therein was the fact that the webpage presented to the user was presented upon the user's physical device accessing the vendor's location such that a "cookie" could be interfaced with. This identifies the user to the vendor site and information at that vendor's site is then utilized to provide a web page back to a user. However, this information is set at the time of access and not after ordering a product or after sending the unique code thereto. Thus, the steps require that, before the filled in form is sent to the user, that there be a product selected, a unique code sent thereafter and this unique code utilized to complete the transaction. In the *Hartman* reference, certain identifying information is placed into the form and then the user populates the form by selecting items after presentation of the form. In *Hartman*, the user need not see all of the information in the form in order to complete the order. For example, the order form in Fig. 1c provides information as to what has already been ordered, i.e., after the completion of the transaction. Therefore, the web page provided to the user is that associated with an order already placed and the purchase

completed. The only information provided to the user before the single-action operation is that associated with the purchaser such that the purchaser can verify that the service system correctly recognizes the purchaser. (*Hartman*, column 4, lines 37-40.) However, this information is not utilized for the purpose of providing to the user a filled in form. In fact, the *Hartman* reference teaches away from providing the user a filled in form; rather, *Hartman* teaches the use of a single-action operation wherein the complete transaction is made without providing to the user a form. The only form is that in Fig. 1c which is provided to the user “after” the transaction has been completed. This is contrary to the purpose of Applicants present inventive concept, which is to provide to the user a filled in form that the user can view “prior to completion of the on-line transaction.”

Applicants have now made an earnest attempt in order to place this case in condition for allowance. For the reasons stated above, Applicants respectfully request full allowance of the claims as amended. Please charge any additional fees or deficiencies in fees or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 20-0780/PHLY-24,732 of HOWISON & ARNOTT, L.L.P.

Respectfully submitted,
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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

Ex parte JEFFRY JOVAN PHILYAW

Appeal 2007-1745
Application 09/614,937
Technology Center 2100

Decided: DATE, 2007

Before: ALLEN R. MACDONALD, JAY P. LUCAS, and ST. JOHN
COURTENAY III, *Administrative Patent Judges.*

MACDONALD, *Administrative Patent Judge.*

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant appeals a Final Rejection of claims 1-16, 18-33, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 134. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

Appellant invented a method and apparatus for extracting a unique code from a triggering device and retrieving and presenting a web page associated with the unique code. (Spec. 45:2-8.)

Claim 1 is exemplary and is reproduced below:

1. A method of displaying a web page to a user, comprising the steps of:

providing a portable triggering device having a unique code stored therein;

extracting the unique code from the triggering device with an activation system when the portable triggering device is proximate to the activation system, the activation system disposed on a network and physically separate from the triggering device;

retrieving location information associated with the unique code from a database, the location information corresponding to a location of the web page on a remote location disposed on the network;

in response to retrieving the location information, automatically connecting the activation system to the remote location; and

presenting the web page corresponding to the location information of the remote location to the user via the activation system.

The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is:

Hudetz et al.	US 5,978,773	Nov. 2, 1999
Nelson, Jr.	US 6,297,727 B1	Oct. 2, 2001
Russell et al.	US 5,095,248	May 18, 1999
Wellner	US 5,640,193	Jun. 17, 1997
Buckley et al.	US 6,446,871 B1	Sep. 10, 2002
Schmitt et al.	US 5,903,225	May 11, 1999

Claims 1-12, 16,¹ 18-30, 33, and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings and suggestions of Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell.

¹ We note that the summary of the rejections in the Answer at page 3 states claim 17 is rejected over the combination of teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell but claim 17 is cancelled.

Claims 13-15 and 31-32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings and suggestions of Hudetz, Nelson, Russell, and Wellner.

Claims 1-4, 8-11, 16, 18-22, 24, 26, 28-29, 33, and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combined teachings of Buckley and Schmitt.

Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellant or the Examiner, we make reference to the Brief and the Answer for their respective details. Only those arguments actually made by Appellant have been considered in this decision. Arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Brief have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2004).

We AFFIRM.

ISSUE

Has Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in finding that claims 1-16, 18-33, and 35 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)?

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following Findings of Fact (FF) are shown by a preponderance of the evidence.

Hudetz

1. Hudetz teaches an article 48 having a symbol 46. (FIG. 2.) Hudetz teaches that article 48 can be “all types of items” and gives examples of cards, consumer products, newspaper, books, coupons, fliers, and advertisements. (Col. 10, ll. 3-10.) Symbol 46 is a Uniform Product Code (“UPC”) bar code. (Col. 5, ll. 25-26.)

2. Hudetz teaches that an input device 44 reads the symbol 46 from article 48 by, for example, scanning the symbol 46. (Col. 5, ll. 24-25.) One example of an input device 44 is a wand-style bar code reader. (*Id.*) Input device 44 reads the symbol 44 and transfers the symbol to local host 28 via I/O port 38. (FIG. 1 and Col. 5, ll. 22-23.)
3. Hudetz teaches that input device 44 is physically separate from article 48 and input device 44 reads the symbol 46 when input device 44 is proximate to article 48. (FIG. 2.)
4. Hudetz teaches that input device 44 is coupled to local host 28 via I/O port 38. (FIG. 1 and Col. 5, ll. 22-23.) Local host 28 includes a modem 36 and communicates with a service provider 22 via the Internet network. (FIG. 1 and Col. 5, ll. 36-38.)
5. Hudetz teaches that remote nodes 24 and 26 act as servers to local host 28. (Col. 5, ll. 51-52.) Remote nodes 24 and 26 are remote from local host 28 and are accessible to local host 28 via the Internet network. (Col. 5, ll. 61-64.) Remote nodes 24 and 26 store web sites. To access a website, local host 28 requests the web sites by transmitting a URL. (Col. 5, ll. 55-64.) Websites include web pages. (Col. 2, ll. 46-47.)
6. Hudetz teaches that service provider 22 stores a database 60 that includes UPC number read from symbol 46 in fields 70 and 72 and an associated URL in field 74. (Col. 7, ll. 2-13 and FIG. 4.) The URL is an address location of a website located on remote nodes 24 and 26, which are remote from local node 28. (Col. 5, ll. 48-64.)
7. Hudetz teaches that in response to reading of the UPC number by input device 44, a Web server resident on local service provider 22 looks up

the UPC number in database 60. (Col. 8, ll. 43-46.) Database 60 retrieves and transmits to local host 28 all records having a field that matches the UPC number. (Col. 8, ll. 47-49 and Col. 9, ll. 5-10.)

8. Hudetz teaches that the browser software located on local host computer 28 automatically loads the retrieved URL and displays the web page addressed by the URL. (Col. 9, ll. 60-62.)

Nelson

9. Nelson teaches a transponder that includes a memory and the memory stores a unique identification code. (Col. 5, ll. 42-44; Col. 6, ll. 8-13; and Col. 10, ll. 48-50.)
10. Nelson teaches that the transponder is a small size (col. 7, ll. 6-7) and that an assembly with the transponder can be card sized (col. 4, ll. 33-50 and Figs. 1a and 1b).
11. Nelson teaches that the transponder 22, including the memory that stores the unique identification code, is encompassed within a combination of a support 24 and a protective cover 26. (Col. 4, ll. 51-54 and FIG. 2.)
12. Nelson teaches that an interrogator unit 36 transmits an interrogation signal 38 to transponder 34 and, when transponder 34 is close enough to interrogator unit 36 to receive the signal, transponder 34 processes the signal and transmits a response signal 40 back to the interrogator unit 36 containing an identification code. (Col. 3, ll. 10-13 and Col. 6, ll. 16-25.)

13. Nelson teaches that records can be maintained using computerized data base records based on identifications received by interrogation unit 36. (Col. 10, ll. 39-50.)

Russell

14. Russell teaches a system for accessing web pages stored on a network by scanning code symbols using a bar code symbol reader 3A. (Col. 7, ll. 31-52.)

15. Russell teaches that bar code symbol reader 3A reads a bar code symbol and transfers the symbol to Internet terminal 3B. (Col. 8, ll. 1-6.)

16. Russell teaches that the Internet terminal 3B automatically accesses and displays the web page associated with the bar code symbol provided by bar code symbol reader 3A. (Title, Abstract ll. 4-12, and Col. 2, l. 46 - Col. 3, l. 26.)

Wellner

17. Wellner teaches a scanner pen 11 that reads marks on a scanned object and transmits a decoded output to a user interface 15 over radio link 12. (Col. 2, ll. 43-54 and FIG. 1.)

18. Wellner teaches that scanner pen 11 includes a memory 404 that stores a scanner pen identification code and transmits the scanner pen identification code to the interface 15. (Col. 2, l. 66 – Col. 3, l. 14.)

Buckley

19. Buckley teaches a bar code is placed in an article or advertisement. (Col. 4, ll. 41-43.)

20. Buckley teaches that a code reader contained in a writing implement 16 reads and stores the bar code. (Col. 4, ll. 49-52 and Col. 5, l. 42.)

21. Buckley teaches that the writing implement 16 is separated from a data well 26 and that to transfer data from writing implement 16 to data well 26, the data transfer end 20 of the writing implement 16 is inserted into a data well 26. (Col. 5, ll. 43-47.) Signals representing the scanned code are transferred to computer 28 through cable 30. (*Id.*)
22. Buckley teaches that the writing implement 16 communicates with a personal computer using a wireless link. (Col. 5, ll. 48-52.) Computer 28 accesses a network by connecting to an Internet server. (Col. 8, ll. 60-66.)
23. Buckley teaches that computer 28 receives codes from the data well and accesses a database contained at a remote location, using the Internet, to obtain an Internet site address corresponding to the code. (Col. 4, l. 64- Col. 5, l. 8 and Col. 8, ll. 60-63.)
24. Buckley teaches that accessing the database provides an Internet home page URL address and the computer system connects to the Internet site corresponding to the URL address using a web browser. (FIG. 9; Col. 3, ll. 31-41; Col. 8, l. 64 – Col. 9, l. 7; and Col. 12, ll. 5-14.)

Schmitt

25. Schmitt teaches an access triggering device that is capable of transmitting an authorization signal associated with the access triggering device. (Col. 2, ll. 51-55.)
26. Schmitt teaches that the access triggering device is carried by a person. (Col. 12, l. 47.)
27. Schmitt teaches that the access triggering device is a passive transponder and that a transponder powering means powers the passive

transponder when positioned in proximity to the passive transponder. (Col. 3, ll. 7-11; Col. 12, ll. 34-55; and Col. 13, ll. 3-10.) The passive transponder responds to the powering by transmitting the authorization signal to a receiver. (Col. 12, ll. 34-46.)

28. Schmitt teaches that an access controller 210 (that wirelessly interrogates an access triggering device 207) is coupled to a computer 201 through connection 252. (Fig. 14 and Col. 12, l. 34 – Col. 13, l. 15.)

PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Appellant has the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error in the Examiner's position. *See In re Kahn*, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a rejection [under § 103] by showing insufficient evidence of *prima facie* obviousness or by rebutting the *prima facie* case with evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness.”) (quoting *In re Rouffet*, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, and (3) the level of skill in the art. *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383

U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). *See also KSR*, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 ("While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [*Graham*] factors continue to define the inquiry that controls."). The Court in *Graham* further noted that evidence of secondary considerations, such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., "might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." 383 U.S. at 18. "If a court, or patent examiner, conducts this analysis and concludes the claimed subject matter was obvious, the claim is invalid under § 103." *KSR*, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.

In *KSR*, the Supreme Court emphasized "the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art," *id.* at 1739, and discussed circumstances in which a patent might be determined to be obvious. In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized that "the principles laid down in *Graham* reaffirmed the 'functional approach' of *Hotchkiss*, 11 How. 248 [(1850)]." *KSR*, 127 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966)), and reaffirmed principles based on its precedent that "[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results." *Id.* The operative question in this "functional approach" is thus "whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions." *Id.* at 1740.

The Federal Circuit recently concluded that it would have been obvious to combine (1) a device for actuating a phonograph to play back sounds associated with a letter in a word on a puzzle piece with (2) a

processor-driven device capable of playing the sound associated with a first letter of a word in a book. *Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.*, 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In reaching that conclusion, the Federal Circuit recognized that "[a]n obviousness [determination] is not the result of a rigid formula disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a case. Indeed, the common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why some combinations would have been obvious where others would not." *Id.* at 1161 (citing *KSR*, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007)).

Although the combination of prior art references lacked a "reader" to automatically identify the book inserted in the device, the Federal Circuit found no error in the District Court's determination that readers were well known in the art at the time of the invention. *Id.* at 1162. In addition, the Court found that the reasons for adding a reader to the combination of prior art references "are the same as those for using readers in other children's toys-namely, providing an added benefit and simplified use of the toy for the child in order to increase its marketability." *Id.* at 1162. The Federal Circuit relied in part on the fact that Leapfrog had presented no evidence that the inclusion of a reader in the combined device was "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art" or "represented an unobvious step over the prior art." *Id.* (citing *KSR*, 127 S. Ct. at 1740-41).

ANALYSIS

Appellant separately alleges the patentability of independent claims 1 and 19, and dependent claims 13 and 31. Appellant has not presented any substantive arguments directed to the separate patentability of dependent claims 2-12, 16, 18, 20-30, 33, and 35, but relies instead on their arguments

for patentability of independent claims 1 and 19. Appellant has not presented any substantive arguments directed to the separate patentability of dependent claims 14-15 and 32, but relies instead on their arguments for patentability of independent claims 13 and 31. In the absence of a separate argument with respect to the dependent claims, those claims stand or fall with the representative independent claims. *See In re Young*, 927 F.2d 588, 590 (Fed. Cir. 1991). *See also* 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004).

Claims 1-12, 16, 18-30, 33, and 35 stand rejected over the combined teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell. Because Appellant only alleges that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 19 (Br. 7-17), and because claims 1 and 19 recite similar limitations, we select claim 1 as the sole claim from which to decide the appeal of all the claims in this group.

Claims 13-15 and 31-32 stand rejected over the combined teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, Russell, and Wellner. Because Appellant only alleges that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 13 and 31 (Br. 22-25), and because claims 13 and 31 recite similar limitations, we select claim 13 as the sole claim from which to decide the appeal of all the claims in this group.

The Examiner has also rejected claims 1-4, 8-11, 16, 18-22, 24, 26, 28-29, 33, and 35 as being obvious over the teachings of Buckley and Schmitt. Because Appellant only alleges that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 19 (Br. 17-22), and because claims 1 and 19 recite similar limitations, we select claim 1 as the sole claim from which to decide the appeal of all the claims in this group.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

We find Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-16, 18-33, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

A. Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 over Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell

We find that there is reason to combine the teachings and suggestions of Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell and such combination teaches all elements of claim 1. First, we support our finding that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combined teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell teach all elements of claim 1. Next, we support our finding that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred by combining of teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell.

1. The cited references teach all elements of claim 1

Claim 1 requires a portable triggering device having a unique code stored therein. The Examiner relies on Nelson to teach the required portion of claim 1. (Ans. 4 and 15.) However, Appellant alleges that Hudetz, rather than Nelson, does not teach such requirement of claim 1 and alleges the combination of teachings of Hudetz with Nelson is improper. (Br. 7-15.)

Because Appellant does not allege that the Examiner erred in finding that Nelson teaches the element of a portable triggering device having a

unique code stored therein (Br. 12-15), Appellant has not met the burden of showing that the Examiner erred. Moreover, based upon our review of the record, we find that Nelson teaches providing a portable triggering device having a unique code stored therein. (FF 9-13.)

Claim 1 requires extracting the unique code from the triggering device with an activation system when the portable triggering device is proximate to the activation system and that the activation system is disposed on a network and is physically separate from the triggering device. The Examiner relies on Nelson to teach the cited portion of claim 1. (Ans. 4 and 15.) The Appellant alleges that Hudetz, rather than Nelson, does not disclose an “activation system” and alleges the combination of teachings of Hudetz with Nelson is improper. (Br. 8-15.)

Because Appellant does not even allege that the Examiner erred in finding that Nelson teaches the elements of an “activation system” that extracts a unique code from a triggering device and the activation system is disposed on a network and physically separate from the triggering device, Appellant has not met the burden of showing that the Examiner erred. Nevertheless, we find the combination of Hudetz and Nelson teaches extracting the unique code from the triggering device with an activation system when the portable triggering device is proximate to the activation system and that the activation system is disposed on a network and is physically separate from the triggering device.

We begin our analysis by construing the term “activation system.” During examination of a patent application, a claim is given its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. *In re Prater*, 415

F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969). "[T]he words of a claim 'are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.'" *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). Here, Appellant's Specification does not provide an explicit definition of the term "activation system." In the "Summary of Claimed Subject Matter" in the Brief, Appellant refers to reference number 2502 of Fig. 25 as an example of "triggering device" and in summarizing "activation system", Appellant refers to reference numbers 2500, 2504, and 2506 of Figs. 25 and 26, among others. (Br. 2-3.) However, reference numeral 2500 in Fig. 25 refers to an object and the Specification states that "object 2500 . . . contains a passive transponder 2502". (Spec. 45:17-18.) But, claim 1 states that the activation system is *physically separate* from the triggering device. Thus, contrary to the Appellant's allegation that the activation system includes object 2500, the activation system of claim 1 *cannot* include object 2500, otherwise the activation system would contain the triggering device and would not be physically separate from the triggering device, as required by the language of claim 1. Instead, the activation system includes transmitter 2504 and receiver 2506, which are connected to a network through PC 302. Therefore, we broadly but reasonably construe the claimed "activation system" to at least require a transmitter and receiver capable of transmitting and receiving signals to and from a triggering device.

Nelson teaches that interrogator unit 36 *transmits* an interrogation signal 38 to transponder 34 and, when transponder 34 is close enough to interrogator unit 36 to receive the signal, transponder 34 processes the signal and transmits a response signal 40 back to the interrogator unit 36 containing

an identification code so that interrogator unit 36 *receives* the response signal 40 (FF 12). Similarly, Hudetz teaches that when input device 44 is a scanner, the scanner reads a symbol 46 by *transmitting* a light towards the symbol 46 and *receiving* a light pattern from the symbol 46 (FF 1-3). Hudetz further teaches that input device 44 reads a symbol 46 and the input device 44 is coupled to a network through coupling to local host 28 (FF 1-4). Thus, we find the combination of Hudetz and Nelson teaches extracting the unique code from the triggering device with an activation system when the portable triggering device is proximate to the activation system and the activation system is disposed on a network and is physically separate from the triggering device.

Claim 1 requires retrieving location information associated with the unique code from a database and that the location information corresponds to a location of a web page on a remote location disposed on the network. The Examiner relies on Hudetz to teach this portion of claim 1. (Ans. 3.) The Appellant does not dispute the Examiner's finding. (Br. 7-17.)

Because Appellant does not allege that the Examiner erred in finding that Hudetz teaches the element of retrieving location information associated with the unique code from a database and that the location information corresponds to a location of the web page on a remote location disposed on the network, Appellant has not met the burden of showing that the Examiner erred. Moreover, based on our review of the record, we find that Hudetz teaches retrieving location information associated with the unique code from a database and that the location information corresponds to a location of the web page on a remote location disposed on the network. (FF 6 and 7.)

Claim 1 requires automatically connecting the activation system to the remote location in response to retrieving the location information. The Examiner relies on Russell to teach this portion of claim 1. (Ans. 5.) Appellant does not dispute the Examiner's finding that Russell teaches the aforementioned portion of claim 1 but instead alleges there is insufficient motivation to combine the teachings of Hudetz and Nelson with those of Russell or to modify the teachings of Hudetz and Nelson to arrive at automatically connecting the activation system to the remote location. (Br. 15-17.) Appellant also contends that Hudetz teaches away from a combination with Russell. (Br. 15-17.)

Because Appellant does not even allege that the Examiner erred in finding that Russell teaches an element of automatically connecting the activation system to the remote location in response to retrieving the location information, Appellant has not met the burden of showing that the Examiner erred. Moreover, based on our review of the record, we find that Russell teaches automatically connecting the activation system to the remote location in response to retrieving the location information. (FF 15-16.)

Claim 1 requires presenting the web page corresponding to the location information of the remote location to the user via the activation system. The Examiner relies on Hudetz to teach this cited portion of claim 1. (Ans. 4.) The Appellant does not dispute the Examiner's finding. (Br. 8-9.)

Because Appellant does not even allege that the Examiner erred in finding that Hudetz teaches an element of presenting the web page corresponding to the location information of the remote location to the user

via the activation system, Appellant has not met the burden of showing Examiner error. Moreover, based on our review of the record, we find that Hudetz teaches the cited portion of claim 1 by teaching that the browser software located on local host computer 28 automatically loads the retrieved URL and displays the web page addressed by the URL. (FF 8.)

2. The combination of teachings of the cited references is proper

We have thoroughly considered the Appellant's allegations that the Examiner erred by combining the teachings of Hudetz with the teachings of Nelson and Russell. We do not agree.

A. Nelson's passive transponder and interrogator system

We first address the substitution of Nelson's passive transponder and interrogator system in place of Hudetz's article of commerce and scanner system. The Examiner finds motivation to combine the teachings of Hudetz with those of Nelson because Hudetz suggests exploring art and/or provides a motivation to modify the teachings of Hudetz to include a portable triggering device having a unique code stored therein and use an interrogator system to extract the code and also because Hudetz and Nelson are both analogous art. (Ans. 4-5 and 16-17.) Moreover, the Examiner's proffered motivation for an artisan to have modified Hudetz to include Nelson's passive transponder is taken directly from the reference: "Hudetz goes on to suggest '[a]lternatively, a RF data collection scanner or CCD scanning system could be used.' (Hudetz, column, 12, lines 17-18)." (Ans. 14 and 17.)

Appellant alleges the combination is improper because there is no teaching or suggestion for the combination. (Br. 9-15.) Appellant also alleges there is no motivation to modify the teachings of Hudetz to arrive at a portable triggering device having a unique code stored therein. (*Id.*) Appellant further contends that Hudetz teaches away from the solution taught by Nelson. (Br. 14-15.)

We have considered Appellant's argument that Hudetz teaches away from the solution taught by Nelson, but do not agree. We agree with the Examiner that Hudetz provides a clear motivation (at column 12, lines 17-18) to incorporate Nelson's passive transponder and interrogator system in place of Hudetz's article and scanner system.

B. Automatic connection to a remote location

Next, we address incorporation of Russell's automatic connection to a remote location into Hudetz and Nelson's activation system. The Examiner finds that Hudetz suggests exploring the art of Russell and/or provides a reason to modify the combined method of Hudetz and Nelson to include automatically connecting the activation system to the remote location. (Ans. 5 and 18.) Appellant alleges that Hudetz teaches away from combination with Russell because Hudetz states several reasons why it may not be practical to include URLs in bar code symbols, whereas Russell teaches having URLs encoded in bar codes. (Br. 15-17.)

We have considered Appellant's argument that Hudetz teaches away from the solution taught by Russell, but do not agree. We find Hudetz provides a reason to incorporate Russell's automatic connection to a remote

location into Hudetz and Nelson's activation system by teaching that the browser software located on local host computer 28 automatically both loads a retrieved URL associated with a symbol and displays a web page addressed by the URL. (FF 6-8.)

3. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-12, 16, 18-30, 33, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

B. Claim 13

Claim 13 requires that the activation system have an associated interface identification code. The Examiner relies on Wellner to teach such requirement of claim 13. (Ans. 8-9 and 20-21.) The Examiner finds that the combination of Wellner with Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell is proper because all of the references are in an analogous art and because "[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the in[vention] was made to modify the combined teachings of Hudetz and Nelson with the teachings of Richton [Wellner] to include a unique interface identification code in order to allow a user to control the selection of electronic services to be provided to the user by one or more servers over a communication medium (Wellner, column 1 lines 33-36) because this enables the selected electronic service transmitted from the servers to be received by the user's receiver." (Answer 9.)

Appellant does not dispute the Examiner's finding that Russell teaches that the activation system has an associated interface identification code but instead alleges, in a pre-*KSR* Appeal Brief, that there is insufficient motivation to combine the teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, Russell, and Wellner or to modify the teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, or Russell to arrive at activation system having an associated interface identification code. (Br. 22-25.)

Because Appellant does not even allege the Examiner erred in finding that Wellner teaches the activation system has an associated interface identification code, Appellant has not met the burden of showing that the Examiner erred. Moreover, based on our review of the record, we find that Wellner teaches that the activation system has an associated interface identification code. (FF 17-18.)

"[W]hen a patent 'simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform' and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious." *KSR*, 127 S. Ct. at 1740 (citing *Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc.*, 425 U. S. 273, 282 (1976)). Here, Wellner's scanner pen identification code (stored in scanner pen 11) and Hudetz and Nelson's activation system are *old elements*. Including a scanner pen identification code in Hudetz and Nelson's activation system maintains the *same functions* performed by both the scanner pen identification code and the activation system because it merely adds an identification code to the activation system for identification of the activation system. Thus, we find the proffered use of Wellner's scanner pen identification code in Hudetz and Nelson's activation system yields a

predictable result because it uniquely identifies Hudetz and Nelson's activation system.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 13-15 and 31-32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

C. Rejection of claim 1 over Buckley and Schmitt

The Examiner rejects claim 1 over the combined teachings of Buckley and Schmitt. (Ans. 9-11 and 19-20.) The Examiner finds that Buckley teaches all elements of claim 1 except for a portable triggering device having a unique code stored therein and extracting the code from the triggering device with an activation system when the triggering device is proximate to the activation system. (*Id.*) The Examiner relies on Schmitt to teach the elements not taught by Buckley. (*Id.*)

Appellant alleges that Buckley does not teach an "activation system" and that the combination of teachings of Buckley and Schmitt is improper. (Br. 18-22.) Appellant does not allege that the Examiner erred in finding that the combined teachings of Buckley and Schmitt teaches all elements of claim 1 other than an activation system. (*Id.*)

Based on our review of the record, we find that the combined teachings of Buckley and Schmitt teach all elements of claim 1, including the activation system. (FF 19-27.)

We specifically address Appellant's contention that Buckley does not teach an "activation system." As we discussed *supra* with regard to the rejection of claim 1 over the combined teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, and

Russell, we broadly but reasonably construe the claimed “activation system” to at least require a transmitter and receiver capable of transmitting and receiving signals to and from a triggering device.

Claim 1 requires that the activation system extract a unique code from a portable triggering device when the portable triggering device is proximate to the activation system. Schmitt teaches a passive transponder, carried by a person, transmits the passive transponder’s authorization signal to a receiver when a transponder powering means is positioned in proximity to the passive transponder. (FF 25-27.)

Claim 1 also requires that the activation system is disposed on a network and is physically separate from the triggering device. Buckley teaches that a writing implement 16 reads and stores a bar code stored on an article. (FF 19-20.) Buckley teaches that a writing implement 16 communicates with a personal computer using a wireless link and the computer accesses a network by connecting to an Internet server. (FF 22-24.) Buckley teaches that the writing implement 16 is separated from a data well 26 and that to transfer data from writing implement 16 to data well 26, the data transfer end 20 of the writing implement 16 is inserted into a data well 26. (FF 21.) Thus, we find the combination of Buckley and Schmitt teaches an activation system that extracts a unique code from a portable triggering device when the portable triggering device is proximate to the activation system and that the activation system is disposed on a network and is physically separate from the triggering device.

We next address whether the Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in combining the teachings of Buckley and with those of Schmitt. The

Examiner finds that Buckley suggested exploration of art and/or provided a reason to modify the method and apparatus with other features such as the wireless portable triggering device taught by Schmitt. (Ans. 10-11 and 19-20.)

Appellant alleges that the Examiner's cited portions of Buckley and Schmitt do not provide a suggestion to combine the teachings of Buckley and Schmitt. (Br. 20-22.)

We disagree. We find Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in combining the teachings of Schmitt with those of Buckley. Where, as here, the application claims the combination of familiar elements according to known methods, it is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. *KSR*, 127 S. Ct. at 1739. Because both Schmitt and Buckley teach techniques for obtaining a unique code from a portable device, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had good reason to pursue the known options of substituting Schmitt's transponder powering means that interrogates a passive transponder to receive an identification stored by the transponder in place of Buckley's code reader that reads and transfers a unique code from an article by connection with a data well 26. It would require no more than *ordinary skill and common sense* for a system to automate the identification retrieval by using a transponder powering means and a passive transponder with a unique code in place of a system with code reader that reads an article with a unique symbol. *See KSR*, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. Both of Schmitt's and Buckley's code reader systems are coupled to a computer (FF 22 and 28). Thus, substituting Schmitt's system in place of Buckley's system would require no more than

ordinary skill and common sense. One of ordinary skill in the art would have achieved a predictable result by substituting Schmitt's system in place of Buckley's system because the functions of Schmitt's system are maintained.

Appellant has presented no evidence that giving the information retrieval system designer the choice of implementing Schmitt's transponder system in place of Buckley's code reader system was *uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art* nor has Appellant presented evidence that this *represented an unobvious step over the prior art*. See *Leapfrog*, 485 F.3d at 1162.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-4, 8-11, 16, 18-22, 24, 26, 28-29, 33, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

On the record before us, we conclude that:

- (1) Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding claims 1-12, 16, 18-30, 33, and 35 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, and Russell;
- (2) Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding claims 13-15 and 31-32 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Hudetz, Nelson, Russell, and Wellner;
- (3) Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding claims 1-4, 8-11, 16, 18-22, 24, 26, 28-29, 33, and 35 are also unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the combined teachings of Buckley and Schmitt; and

(4) claims 1-16, 18-33, and 35 are not patentable.

DECISION

The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-16, 18-33, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

APJ initials

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JPL

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